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Brooks: Property Law

PROPERTY LAW
I.

IMPLIED WARRANTIES TO

HoME

PURCHASERS LIMITED

In Arvai v. Shaw1 the South Carolina Supreme Court decided that a builder who is not also a seller of a new home does
not warrant impliedly the fitness and habitability of the home.
2
Although the supreme court agreed with the court of appeals
that no warranty arose in this case, it concluded, unlike the
court of appeals, that "whether a house is built for speculation
or is custom-built is not determinative." 3 Instead, the determinative factor was that the defendant was merely the builder of
the allegedly defective house. After Arvai, the only parties who
may be liable for the sale of a defective home are those who
build and then sell the home as a completed structure (buildervendors) and those who sell a completed home built by someone
else (vendors). A party who builds but who does not also sell a
defective home apparently will not be liable for the defects
under an implied warranty of fitness. Arvai may signal a new
conservatism in the court's approach to the extension of implied
warranties to home purchasers.4
The crucial fact in Arvai was that the allegedly defective
house was sold before it was constructed. In 1970, Jack Shaw
and Jack Shaw Builders, Inc. (Shaw) sold an unimproved lot to
Thomas and Margaret Farr. Shaw then built a home on the lot
pursuant to plans and specifications provided by the Farrs. The
court thus deemed Shaw to be the builder, but not the seller of
the home. After moving into the home, the Farrs became disenchanted with their septic tank system and reconveyed the
home to Shaw. Shaw then sold the house to James and Francis
Semone. The Semones sold the house to the Arvais in September 1976, approximately five years after the Semones had purL. 289

S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986).
2. 286 S.C. 357, 334 S.E.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1985).
3. 289 S.C. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717.
4. For a discussion of the prior development of the implied warranty in South
Carolina, see Note, Implied Warrantiesin New Home Sales-Is the Seller Defenseless?
35 S.C.L. REv. 469 (1984).
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chased the home from Shaw. Just after moving into the home,
the Arvais experienced flooding from a creek located near the
rear of the lot.5 Periodic flooding continued and the Arvais sued
Shaw for a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
and fitness for the intended purposes of habitability.'
The circuit court granted a summary judgment motion in
Shaw's favor. The court of appeals upheld the lower court's dismissal on the sole ground that the reasons underlying extension
of an implied warranty to a house built for speculation do not
support an implied waranty of fitness for a custom-built home.7
In a skeletal decision the supreme court also denied relief to
the Arvais. At the heart of the court's decision was a distinction
between a "general contractor or other builder" and "the initial
vendor" of a home." The court held that a general contractor or
builder will not be accountable under an implied warranty for
defects in a home because "[t]he determining factor is not
whether the defendant actually builds the defective house, but
that he places it, by the initial sale, into the stream of commerce." The South Carolina Supreme Court apparently believes
that building a home is not the same as selling a home and that
the seller of a home is more culpable for defects in that home
than is the builder. The court's conclusion is a stark departure
from the prior evolution of implied warranties for new homes in
South Carolina and in other states. 10
5. The flooding apparently was due to the failure of a holding pond built by upstream developers. Although the pond failure did not bear upon the issue before the
court of appeals or the supreme court, the fact appears to have weighed heavily in favor
of the defendants. Before this appeal, the Arvais had filed suit against the developers,
but had entered into a settlement. Brief of Respondents at 2.
6. The Arvais also raised a negligence cause of action which was not preserved for
supreme court review. 289 S.C. at 163 n.1, 345 S.E.2d at 716 n.1.
7. The court of appeals noted that caveat emptor controlled the law of new home
sales prior to World War 11 when purchasers more closely supervised construction of new
homes. The court reasoned as follows:
The sale of mass-produced homes to unwary consumers who were unable to
supervise their construction brought about the decline of caveat emptor.
Here, however, a speculative-built house is not involved. Rather, it is a
house built . . . according to owner supplied plans and specifications. In this
respect, then, the situation is one similar, if not identical, to the construction
practice commonly followed before World War IL
286 S.C. at 360, 334 S.E.2d at 288.
8.289 S.C. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 716.
9. Id., 345 S.E.2d at 717.
10. For a thorough discussion of the history of the implied warranty, see Haskell,
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Arvai contrasts with the previously liberal tendency of
South Carolina courts to extend implied warranties of quality to
home purchasers. The supreme court first held caveat emptor"
2
inapplicable to new home purchases in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff.'
In Rutledge the court recognized that "the essence of the transaction [of buying a new house] is the purchase of a habitable
dwelling and that a knowledgeable inspection by the buyer is
impossible."1 3 The court therefore held caveat emptor "inapplicable to sales where the vendor is also the builder of a new
4
structure."'
The supreme court expanded the category of parties who
may be liable for new home defects in Lane v. Trenholm Building Co.' 5 In Lane the court ruled that the law of sales, not the
law of property, should control the sale of a new house. Consequently, a vendor of a new home was held liable for construction
defects in the home, even though the vendor had not built the
house. The court held that "liability is not founded upon fault,
but because [the seller] has profited by receiving a fair price
and, as between it and an innocent purchaser, the innocent purchaser should be protected from latent defects."' 6 Thus, after
Rutledge and Lane, a purchaser of a defective home would be
protected if the seller were a builder-vendor or if the seller were
merely a vendor. The only category of defendant in this context
remaining to be considered was the builder. Arvai apparently
settled the question by holding that simply building a home is
not enough to trigger an implied warranty that the home will be
free from defects.
While Arvai does not alter Lane or Rutledge, Arvai does
raise new questions about what policies the implied warranty of
The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J.
633 (1965); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did
It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967); Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New
Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291 (1980).
11. Caveat emptor means literally "let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1968). The doctrine of caveat emptor is based upon the policy that a
buyer should inspect property before purchase and negotiate warranties of quality with
the seller. See Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 112 (1884).
12. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
13. Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
14. Id. at 413, 175 S.E.2d at 795 (emphasis added).
15. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
16. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
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quality now supports. 17 The most culpable party in a sale of a
defective home would seem to be the builder who created the
defect. After Arvai, however, a builder who does not also sell a
completed home will not be liable under an implied warranty,
but a potentially faultless seller will be held liable."' The rationale in Lane for holding liable an innocent vendor was a logical
extention of Rutledge. Arvai, however, presents a paradox in the
law when viewed against the policies supporting Rutledge and
Lane.
Arvai is also anomalous when viewed in the broader context
of the implied warranty's development in England and in other
states. The English law still adheres to the concept of caveat
emptor in the sale of a completed new home's because the buyer
or his surveyor can inspect the house to determine the home's
fitness for occupation. 20 The courts of England, however, laid
the foundation for the eventual American implied warranty
when they carved an exception to the caveat emptor doctrine in
situations in which a purchaser bought a home not yet constructed or only partially constructed. One commentator explains that the English courts were in a dilemma when addressing whether an implied warranty should protect the purchaser of
a partially completed home because the question presented fell
between two bodies of settled law:
On the one hand, caveat emptor clearly applied to the sale of a
completed house. On the other, a landowner who retained a
builder to construct a house for him was entitled to an implied
term that the job would be done in a workmanlike manner
with proper materials ....
In the instance of the sale of an
unfinished home the builder-vendor had become so much a
"builder" that he lost the usual vendor's protection of caveat
21
emptor.

17. Historically, the implied warranty of quality protected innocent home purchasers against shoddy workmanship. See generally infra notes 19-27 and accompanying
text.
18. In Lane, for instance, the court noted that the vendor of the defective home
was not responsible for the defects and "had no better opportunity to inspect for latent
defects than the purchaser," but the court nonetheless held the vendor liable. 267 S.C. at
501, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
19. See, e.g., Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.).
20. Id. at 395.
21. Roberts, supra note 10, at 838 (footnotes omitted).
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Because the English jurists viewed a contract for construction or
completion of a home as "not merely a contract to sell, but also
a contract to do building work, [the English courts felt] it [was]
only natural and proper that there should be an implied undertaking that the building work should be done properly. '22 From
its inception, then, the implied warranty of a home was a protection against a builder's shoddy workmanship.
When the implied warranty first emerged in American jurisprudence, the concern was also with the building, not with the
selling of the defective home. The Ohio Court of Appeals, for
example, expressly adopted the English rationale when it became the first state court to imply a warranty of quality in the
transaction of a partially completed home. 3 One year later the
Supreme Court of Washington also extensively quoted the English cases when adopting the implied warranty for a home under
construction at the time of sale.2 4 Ironically in Hoye v. Century
Builders the Washington court cited a South Carolina case2 5 for
the proposition that a construction contractor impliedly warrants that his work will be "of proper workmanship and reasonable fitness for its intended use."'2 6 Until this point, the implied
warranty was a creature of contract law and caveat emptor remained a viable property law concept.
When the two concepts eventually collided, however, policy
prevailed over tradition, and the Colorado Supreme Court became the first to hold that the distinction between a partially
constructed house and a completed house is "a distinction without a reasonable basis. '2 7 The Colorado court, therefore, dispensed with the application of caveat emptor in transactions of
new houses. Thus, what had begun as an implied term in a contract to build a home that the home would be constructed properly had evolved initially into an implied warranty of fitness for

22. [1937] 4 All E.R. at 396.
23. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
24. Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
25. Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
26. 52 Wash. 2d at 833, 329 P.2d at 474 (quoting 219 S.C. at 271, 64 S.E.2d at 888).
In addition, the South Carolina General Assembly impliedly recognized the existence of
a cause of action against the builder of a new structure in S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640

(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) which establishes a statute of limitations of 13 years for actions to recover damages for the negligent construction or repair, and for breach of a
contract to construct or repair an improvement to real property.
27. Carpenter v. Donahoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964).
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a home purchased while under construction, and then later, into
an implied warranty of fitness for a completed home. When a
home was purchased before or during construction, contract law
controlled the transaction and the property law concept of caveat emptor simply did not apply. When the home was purchased after construction had been completed, the courts concluded that supporting the public policies of the implied
warranty was more important than perpetuating the tradition of
caveat emptor.
In Arvai the defendant was a home builder. Even before caveat emptor was abolished, a landowner who hired a contractor
to build a house could hold the builder liable for defects in the
home under a purely contractual implied warranty of workmanlike construction.28 Nonetheless, the defendant in Arvai was
held free from liability because he was a builder. The logic of
this conclusion, when viewed in a historical perspective, is puzzling, and the net effect of the Arvai holding is to create for the
implied warranty of workmanlike construction an even greater
identity crisis. How Arvai will affect future actions against
builders, then, remains at least interesting, if not also open.
Given the incongruity of Arvai with history, the lack of relevant authority in support of the court's conclusions is understandable. The court claimed that most jurisdictions concur that
a builder who is not also a vendor of a home will not be held
liable under an implied warranty theory. The American Law Reports annotations s cited in support of this conclusion, however,
do not relate to the conclusion. The cases listed in each annotation deal not with the distinction between a builder and a
builder-vendor, but rather address the continuing viability of caveat emptor3 0 and lack of privity as bars to recovery by disgrun-

28. See [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.). Cf. 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (defendant
who furnished plans and specifications for construction of commercial frozen food locker
plant held liable for damage resulting from defective design).
29. See Annotation, Liability of Builder of Residence for Latent Defects Therein
As Running to Subsequent PurchasersFrom Original Vendee, 10 A.L.R.4TH 385 (1981);
Annotation, Liability of Builder-Vendor or other Vendor of New Dwelling for Loss, Injury, or Damage Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3D 385 (1981).
30. In 25 A.L.R.3D 385, supra note 29, none of the cases listed in the annotation
which deny recovery under an implied warranty theory based their denial on a distinction between a vendor, builder-vendor, and a builder. Most of the decisions denied recovery because of the continued viability of caveat emptor. The most recent case listed
was decided in 1968, two years before South Carolina rejected the caveat emptor doc-
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tled home purchasers.3 1 South Carolina, of course, is already
firmly in line with those jurisdictions which have rejected caveat
emptor in favor of caveat venditor32 and which allow recovery to
subsequent purchasers who are not in privity with the initial
vendor of the home. The court also cited Redarowicz v.
Ohlendor 4 for the proposition that "the [implied] warranty of
habitability has its roots in the execution of a contract for
sale."3 5 Redarowicz, however, dealt with whether a cause of action for latent defects should extend to subsequent purchasers of
a home, 36 and states in other dicta that "[ijf construction of a
new house is defective, its repair costs should be borne by the
37
responsible builder-vendor who created the latent defect.
Such language causes one to wonder if the Supreme Court of
Illinois would concur with a result which exonerates a builder
because the builder was not also the vendor of a completed
home.
Many questions remain in the wake of Arvai. Perhaps the
most important question, however, is whether Arvai signals an
erosion in the court's resolve to protect consumers in the home

market or whether this decision will stand as an aberration in
the development of implied warranties for new homes in South
Carolina.
Robert H. Brunson

trine in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970). Interestingly, one
commentator, describing the state of the law in the mid-1960s, wrote: "Although implied
warranties have been recognized in connection with a contract to construct a new
house, the common-law rule that quality is at the risk of the purchaser in the sale of real
property is still the law except in Louisiana, and with respect to new houses, Colorado
and probably New Jersey." Haskel, supra note 10, at 633 (emphasis added).
31. In 10 A.L.R.4TH 385, supra note 29, the annotation addressed the continuing
viability of privity as a bar to remote purchasers of a house. Among the cases listed
which allowed remote purchasers to recover despite lack of privity is Terlinde v. Neely,
275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980). Although the court in Arvai cited Wisconsin as an
exception to the majority rule which denies recovery to purchasers from builders, Moxley
v. Laramie Builders, Inc. 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979) is juxtaposed with Terlinde in the
list of cases allowing recovery to subsequent purchasers of houses. Also, the supreme
court in Terlinde cited Moxley in declaring that allowing privity to persist as a bar to
recovery would be "incomprehensible." 275 S.C. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
32. See 254 S.C. at 407, 175 S.E.2d at 792.
33. See 275 S.C. at 395, 271 S.E. 2d at 768.
34. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
35. 289 S.C. 161, 164, 345 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1986) (citing 92 Ill. 2d at 183, 441
N.E.2d at 330).
36. 92 Ill. 2d at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 330.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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II.

TENANT PROTECTION EXPANDED

In Holmes v. Rosner" the South Carolina Court of Appeals
declined an opportunity to join the majority of states that recognize an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.
The court of appeals, however, did permit the plaintiff to maintain an action based on a landlord's breach of an express warranty of habitability or fitness.3 9 The court's view of the circumstances that gave rise to the express warranty will provide a new
avenue of relief for tenants, and the case as a whole may be a
harbinger of the inevitable modernization of South Carolina's
law of landlord-tenant relations.
Holmes, a tenant, brought suit to recover for severe burns
and other injuries that she suffered when a fire broke out in the
kitchen of her apartment. The apartment was part of a duplex
built by her landlord nineteen years earlier. Faulty wiring, improperly installed by the landlord, caused the fire. The trial
court sustained the landlord's demurrer to all of Holmes' five
causes of action, including express and implied warranties of
habitability. The court of appeals affirmed the finding on im4 a 1985 South
plied warranty, relying on Young v. Morrisey,"
Carolina Supreme Court decision that upheld South Carolina's
refusal to imply a warranty of habitability in leases.
On the issue of express warranty of habitability, however,
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding and remanded the case for further determination because an agent of
the landlord had assured Holmes that "'the building was fit for
use as a residence by her family, that it was in good condition
and that the [landlord] would do all things necessary . . . to

keep and maintain said premises in a safe condition, fit for use
as a residence by her family.' ,,41 Thus, Holmes distinguished between express warranty to maintain leased premises in a safe
condition and express warranty of fitness or habitability. The
former restricts the tenant to a contractual remedy; the latter

38.
39.
40.
41.

289 S.C. 287, 346 S.E.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 289, 346 S.E.2d at 38.
285 S.C. 236, 329 S.E.2d 426 (1985).
289 S.C. at 289, 346 S.E.2d at 38.
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allows recovery for personal injury.42
As the first decision to allow a tenant to maintain a personal
injury cause of action based on warranty, Holmes promises to
influence landlord-tenant law in South Carolina. Under Holmes,
a tenant who sues his landlord for negligently inflicted personal
injuries can recover, but only if he can prove conduct sufficient
to constitute an express warranty of habitability. What the state
courts will accept as express warranties remains unclear, but the
language in Holmes seems to be commonplace language used by
lessors.
Holmes may signal the inevitability that an implied war-

ranty of habitability will be recognized in South Carolina, although the court of appeals appeared restrained by the supreme
court's recent decision in Young. The next move would seem to
be that of the supreme court, prodded perhaps by the new South
Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which was recently enacted by the legislature.'3
The court of appeals relied on Young without analysis in

affirming the demurrer to Holmes' implied warranty of habitability claim. In Young the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a trial court's grant of summary judgment on allegations of
implied warranty and strict liability."" In addition to citing previous state authority,4 5 the court offered a list of "compelling

42. Id.
43. South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-4010 to -940 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). Section 27-40-440, entitled "Landlord to maintain
premises," requires a landlord to "make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition," and to "maintain in
reasonably good and safe working order and condition . . . facilities and appliances
.... No appliance or facilities necessary to the provision of essential services may be
excluded." The Landlord and Tenant Act became effective 120 days after it was signed
on March 10, 1986.
44. 285 S.C. at 239, 329 S.E.2d at 428.
45. Sheppard v. Nienow, 254 S.C. 44, 173 S.E.2d 343 (1970); Conner v. Farmers &
Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963); Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932); Mallard v. Duke, 131 S.C. 175, 126 S.E. 525
(1925); see also Hatfield v. Palles, 537 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying South Carolina law); Williams v. Riley, 56 N.C. App. 427, 289 S.E.2d 102 (1982) (applying South
Carolina law); Williams v. Salmond, 29 S.C. 459, 61 S.E. 79 (1908); Cantrell v. Fowler, 32
S.C. 589, 10 S.E. 934 (1890); City Council v. Moorhead, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 430 (1846).
None of these cases discusses any possible justification for the common-law rule;
each defers in strict lockstep to precedent. The earliest case in the chain, City Council,
offers no precedent, authority, or justification for its holding. In addition, the City Council and Cantrellcases dealt with tenants who leased houses that were in obvious need of

Published by Scholar Commons, 1987

9

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
South
Carolina
Law Review,
39, Iss. 1 [1987], Art.[Vol.
11

39

reasons" devised by a New Jersey court to explain why an apartment cannot be considered a "product" capable of giving rise to

liability without fault.46 Though the court offered analysis for
not extending strict liability to landlords, it failed to show any
modern justification for the common-law rule of caveat lessee,
by which the tenant takes a rental property "as is."
Caveat lessee is an anachronism because its historical justifications have become outmoded.4 7 The doctrine originated in
the Middle Ages when society was agrarian. Arable land was the
focus of real estate transactions; dwellings on the land were legally insignificant appendages. Leases, therefore, were treated as
conveyances of land, not contracts for living space. As conveyances, leases were governed by the common-law rule of caveat
emptor; as one court put it, "fraud apart, there is no law against

letting a tumbledown house.

'48

As society became urbanized, the city dweller typically became less experienced than his landlord in performing maintenance work on complex living units. In turn, landlords became
more familiar with the dwelling unit and the equipment at-

tached to it and were financially better able to discover and cure
any faults and breakdowns. 49 Recognizing this reality, courts
repairs. Thus, the caveat lessee doctrine in South Carolina seems to have been "built on
the sand" of questionable precedent.
46. 285 S.C. at 240, 329 S.E.2d at 428 (citing Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc.,
123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, aff'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973)). The Young
court declined to take notice of Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.Y. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), a
well-reasoned opinion establishing the implied warranty of habitability in New Jersey as
applied in Dwyer. The Young court did cite Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to
Existence of Implied Warranty of Habitabilityof Fitnessfor Use of Leased Premises,
40 A.L.R.3D 646 (1971), which deals with the modern status of rules as to implied
warranty.
47. For detailed analyses of the historical justifications of caveat lessee, see Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970);
Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Lemle
v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 475 (1969); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897
(1979); Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984); Davis, After the Warranty:
Premises Liability and Property, Tort and Contract Law, 22 TRIAL 38 (March 1986);
Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict
Liability? 1975 WXis. L. REV. 19; Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability:A
Dream Deferred, 48 UMKC L. REv. 237 (1980).
48. Robbins v. Jones, 143 Eng. Rep. 768, 776 (1863). But cf. Pines v. Perssion, 14
Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) (tumble-down houses are a contributing cause of
such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency, and high property taxes for conscientious owners).
49. 428 F.2d at 1077-79; 10 Cal. 3d at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
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carved out limited exceptions which alleviated some of the
harshness of the common-law rule. ° Courts in the 1960s,
spurred by legislative housing and safety codes, began to adopt
the implied warranty of habitability in a number of well-reasoned opinions.5 1 Today a landlord has a duty of safety in the
majority of the jurisdictions; indeed, the implied warranty of
habitability has been embraced by the appellate courts and legislatures of at least forty-one states and the District of
Columbia. 2
In South Carolina the appellate courts' tenacity in retaining
the common-law rules against an implied warranty of habitability in rental property is particularly anomalous when compared
to the zeal with which the supreme court over a decade ago
adopted an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new
property. In Lane v. Trenholm Building Co.,5" a 1976 case, the
court abolished the doctrine of caveat emptor. Justice Ness, for
a unanimous court, wrote, "Disparity in the law should be
founded upon just reason and not the result of adherence to
stale principles which do not comport with current social conditions. ' ' 54 The Lane court recognized that when a new house is

sold, the sale of a product, not a conveyance of land, is involved.
Lane further established that since a sound price commands a
sound commodity, an implied warranty of habitability is within
the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.5 5 In
Young, when confronted with the disparate treatment accorded

50. See, e.g., 51 Haw. 426, 402 P.2d 476 (constructive eviction deemed a legal fiction); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892) (furnished dwellings rented for
a short period of time); King v. Moorhead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973) (landlord
fraud).
51. See 428 F.2d 1071; 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704; see also
51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 476; Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Il1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208
(1972); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Mease v.
Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974);
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Kline v.
Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
52. See Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 281-82, 405 A.2d 897, 901 (1979). Pugh con-

tains an exhaustive listing of 39 jurisdictions which had, by 1979, recognized the implied
warranty of habitability. Pugh established the implied warranty in Pennsylvania, as did

Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984), in Vermont. Therefore at least 41
states and the District of Columbia have embraced the warranty.

53. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
54. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 730-31.

55. Id.
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leases and sales in South Carolina, the supreme court rejected
the analogy provided in Lane and chose to distinguish property
which is rented from that which is sold.5
The decision in Holmes is a step in the right direction for
South Carolina's landlord-tenant law. A cause of action based on
statements of the landlord's agent is an exception to the rule
against implied warranties of habitability that was recognized in
Young. 57 Thus, the court of appeals in Holmes has indicated a
willingness to have landlords assume an appropriate degree of
liability. Future cases, in conjunction with the impetus provided
by the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, should further
modernize South Carolina law in this area.
Charles R. Beans
III.

EXPRESS LANGUAGE REQUIRED TO RESTRICT USE OF

PROPERTY DEMISED IN LEASE

The South Carolina Court of Appeals underscored the importance of care in drafting and construing leases in Chassereau
v. Stuckey.5 6 In Chassereauthe court held that a lease for a specific purpose should be regarded as permissive unless express
language or an independent agreement requires that it be restrictive.59 The case comports with previous South Carolina authority, but where previous state cases required that courts consider all available evidence to determine the correct construction
of ambiguous language in a lease, Chassereauadds the presumption that absent express restrictions, all evidentiary documents
should be construed in favor of any lawful use of the property.6 0
56. 285 S.C. at 241, 329 S.E.2d at 429.
57. Holmes quoted Young: "'As a general rule, there is no implied warranty of
fitness or habitability in leases. A lessee takes leased premises, in the absence of an
express warranty, or of fraud or misrepresentation, in the condition and quality in which
they are.'" 289 S.C. at 289, 346 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting 285 S.C. at 241, 329 S.E.2d at 429)
(emphasis added).
58. 288 S.C. 368, 342 S.E.2d 623 (Ct. App. 1986).
59. Id. at 370, 342 S.E.2d at 624. This case did not address a business situation in
which the conduct or performance of a certain business formed part of the express consideration or rental of the lease, as when rent payments are based on a fixed percentage
of profits from the business.
60. Id. Previous South Carolina cases allowed extrinsic facts and circumstances
into evidence to help determine intent. See, e.g., Price v. Derrick, 262 S.C. 341, 204
S.E.2d 389 (1974); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. V.I.P. Aviation, Inc., 256 S.C.
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Chassereau leased from Stuckey property which had been
used as a beer and billiards establishment,"' for use as an automobile dealership. Chassereau had an attorney prepare a lease.2
After Chassereau had operated the premises as a car lot for two
years, Esteile Ragin sought to sublet the property from him. 3
Because the lease expressly permitted subleasing, Chassereau
and Ragin entered into a sublease agreement. 6 Ragin made extensive and costly renovations to the property 65 to operate a
nightclub, the Dry Gulch Saloon.
Soon after the Dry Gulch opened, Stuckey filed for and obtained a judgment of eviction against Chassereau from the Richland County Magistrate's Court. Stuckey immediately entered
into a new rental agreement with Ragin for the same terms as
had been obtained by Chassereau. The new agreement eliminated the original tenant as an intermediary between landlord
and subtenant.6 6 The magistrate's order evicting Chassereau was
later set aside for inadequate service of process, but Ragin would
not resume payments to Chassereau. Chassereau, therefore, sued

572, 183 S.E.2d 448 (1971); Wise v. Picow, 232 S.C. 237, 101 S.E.2d 651 (1958).
61. Final Order at 13.
62. Id. at 13, 14. The tenant had the lease prepared because he had to provide a
written lease to obtain a loan he was seeking from the Small Business Administration.
Id. Normally, however, the landlord provides the lease. This change of roles was significant to the parties as they examined the usual rules of construction: construe against the
landlord; construe against the drafter. Brief of Appellant at 7; Brief of Respondent at 12,
13. The apparently conflicting rules were not addressed by the trial court, nor by the
court of appeals. Final Order at 17.
The lease provided a term of five years, an option to renew, and a rental fee of $500
per month. The troublesome provision read:
WITNESSETH, That the said Lessor has granted and leased, and by these
presents does grant and lease unto the said Lessee the premises at [ . . . ],
same being a metal building and lot 125 feet by 200 feet, to be used primarily
as an automobile dealership, with all appurtenances thereto belonging.
Record at 31-33.
63. Final Order at 14.
64. The pertinent provision of the lease read as follows: "[T]he Lessee shall be
authorized to sublease any part or all of the building and premises . . . and shall be
entitled to all rents and proceeds therefrom." Record at 32.
65. Final Order at 15. Prior to vacating the premises, Chassereau held an auction,
which Stuckey attended, of the remainder of his business supplies. Ragin worked to renovate the property for six to seven months before the saloon opened. Stuckey made no
protest about the intended use during this time. Id.
66. Considering the property's previous use as a pool hall, the ample notice of the
proposed change in use, and Stuckey's immediate reassignment of the premises to Ragin,
it may be inferred that he did not object to the use of the premises as a drinking establishment; however, he did object to the profit enjoyed by Chassereau.
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Stuckey to recover rent collected from Ragin. Stuckey appealed
from the lower court's order in favor of Chassereau and asserted
that Chassereau had breached his lease with Stuckey by subletting the property.
The opinion of the court of appeals cited Corpus Juris
Secundum for the proposition that the phrase in the lease "to be
used primarily as an automobile dealership" was permissive

rather than restrictive.6

The court did not refer in its decision

to a line of South Carolina cases that mandated a "totality of
the circumstances" analysis of lease provisions. In failing to note
this prior line of cases, the court of appeals ignored a South Carolina Supreme Court ruling that to determine intent of parties

to a lease, four factors must be regarded: (1) the subject matter;
(2) the surrounding circumstances; (3) the situation of the par-

ties; and (4) the object in view and intended to be accomplished
at the time.

8

The Chassereau court also did not refer to previ-

ous cases that have held that a lease must be construed as a
whole in order to determine the meaning of one of its clauses.6 9
The importance of Chassereauis two-fold. First, the case is

67. 510 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 337(b) (1975). The first sentence of the
third paragraph of the opinion of the court of appeals is attributable to 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 232(2) (1975); the third sentence paraphrases § 232(5).
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided a case with a nearly identical fact pattern in
Cox v. Ford Leasing Dev. Co., 170 Ga. App. 81, 316 S.E.2d 182 (1984). In Cox the lease
provided for use of the property as an automobile dealership. The landlord contended
that this constituted a covenant to use the premises for this purpose. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's finding that unless express language is present, the recited
use is descriptive, i.e., permissive and not restrictive. Id. Cf. Commercial Auto Loan
Corp. v. Keith, 79 Ga. App. 268, 53 S.E.2d 318 (1949); Lawrence v. White, 131 Ga. 840,
63 S,E. 631 (1909).
Neither the parties nor the court mentioned the line of analogous cases holding that
deed restrictions concerning use of real estate should be strictly construed and all doubts
resolved in favor of free use of property, unless the restrictions are obvious and unambiguous, E.g., Hoffman v. Cohen, 262 S.C. 71, 202 S.E.2d 363 (1974); accord Baltz v. R. V.
Chandler & Co., 248 S.C. 484, 151 S.E.2d 441 (1966).
68. Price v. Derrick, 262 S.C. 341, 204 S.E.2d 389 (1974) (use of property for a curb
market and residence held not inconsistent with lease term "for business purpose"); accord Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. V.I.P. Aviation, Inc., 256 S.C. 572, 183 S.E.2d
448 (1971); Wise v. Picow, 232 S.C. 237, 101 S.E.2d 561 (1958); Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C.
242, 72 S.E.2d 193 (1952).
Stuckey died during the litigation. The trial court, therefore, was unable to consider
much of the testimony concerning the intent of the parties because of the "Dead Man's
Statute." Final Order at 16; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
69. See 256 S.C. 572, 183 S.E.2d 448 (1971); United States Rubber Co. v. White
Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1957); 222 S.C. 242, 72 S.E.2d 193 (1952).
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useful as a guide to the construction of leases: a magistrate adjudicating an eviction proceeding based on an alleged breach of a
lease condition merely needs to look for express language establishing the restriction. If such language is not present, or is ambiguous, then the recited use is permissive and no breach of condition has taken place.70 Second, the holding reemphasizes the
importance of careful legal drafting to landlords who wish to
place restrictions on the use of their property. The drafter of a
lease must use precise and express language outlining restrictions, and the restrictions must not contradict any other provision of the lease.
Charles R. Beans
IV.

EQUITABLE DEVIATION EXTENDED TO ELIMINATE RACIAL

RESTRICTION IN TRUST

The South Carolina Court of Appeals held in Colin McK.
Grant Home v. Medlock7" that the doctrine of equitable deviation allows a court to amend the terms of a charitable trust
when changed circumstances require an amendment to effectu72
ate the purpose of the trust.
The Colin McK. Grant Home is a corporation chartered by
Colin Grant in 1920 "'[tlo provide a home for Elderly white
Presbyterians of Charleston, South Carolina.' ,,71 When Mr.
Grant died in 1921, he left the residue of his estate to the Home
and directed that the Home be for white Presbyterians of
75
Charleston who were over forty and in reduced circumstances.

70. This does not foreclose other grounds for eviction. After this case was decided,
the subtenant fell behind in rent payments to the tenant. Later, Stuckey's executrix obtained a proper eviction order against Chassereau and hence Ragin. Interview with Robert J.Hallman, Esq. (October 1, 1986).
71. - S.C. ., 349 S.E.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, No. 0804, Davis Adv.
Sh. No. 12 (S.C. April 4, 1987).
72. Id. at Though the principle of equitable deviation is well-established in South
Carolina, the court, following the holdings of other jurisdictions, extended the principle
to permit the elimination of racial restrictions from the terms of a trust when circum73
stances had changed since the establishment of the trust.
73. Id. at , 349 S.E.2d at 660.

74. Id. at _ 349 S.E.2d at 656.
75. Mr. Grant's will directed that the home be used as follows:
for white persons in reduced circumstances, both men and women, who by
faith and profession are Presbyterians and who may be admitted to said Home
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Mrs. Grant died in 1923 and bequeathed all of her residuary estate to the Home "established in memory of her husband, in accordance with the rules and regulations for its management in
force at the time of her death." 6
The codicil to Mr. Grant's will provided that each descendant, to the fourth generation, of his sister Mrs. Elizabeth Rose
be entitled to reside in half of one of the foundation's houses. At
the time of this lawsuit, the neighborhood in which the Home
was located had deteriorated and occupancy of the Home had
declined drastically. Because of these conditions, the trustees
wished to sell the Home's real property and use the proceeds to
create a housing subsidy fund for the beneficiaries of the
trust.7 7 The trustees brought suit against Mr. Grant's heirs when

they refused to renounce their rights under the will and to allow
the trustees to change the terms of the trust. The heirs maintained that the trust had failed in its purpose and, therefore,
should be dissolved, with the heirs to receive the proceeds.78
They further claimed that the trust should be dissolved because
the Home "practiced racial discrimination in violation of the
79
public policy and laws of this State and of the United States.
The master in equity and the circuit court found for the
trustees. The lower courts amended the administrative terms of
the trust through the principle of equitable deviation and held
that the property could be sold and the proceeds could be used
to establish a housing fund for the trust beneficiaries.80 The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court's holding.8
Two doctrines permit courts to amend the terms of a trust.
The first of these doctrines, cy pres, 2 has been rejected consist-

under such rules as may be established by the Trustees of said Home. Provided that ... such persons shall be over forty years of age and shall have
been residents of the City of Charleston for at least five years.
Id. at

..

, 349 S.E.2d at 656-57.

76. Id. at __ 349 S.E.2d at 657.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at -,
Id. at -,
Id. at -,
Id. at -,

349
349
349
349

S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d

at
at
at
at

657.
657.
657.
657.

81. Id. at , 349 S.E.2d at 657; see infra note 86.
82. When a court finds that changed circumstances have caused a charitable trust
to be impractical or impossible to administer according to its literal terms, the court
may, through the doctrine of cy pres, reform the trust to accomplish its general purposes. Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983).
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ently in South Carolina.8 3 The other doctrine, equitable deviation, is well-established. s4 Equitable deviation "permits the
strict terms of a trust to be altered when changed circumstances
so require to effectuate the trust's purpose. ' ' 5
In applying equitable deviation in Colin McK. Grant, the
court examined Mr. Grant's intention in creating the trust. The
court deferred to the findings of the master and the circuit court
"that the primary intent of the settlor was to provide housing
for elderly Charlestonian Presbyterians of reduced circumstances."8 The heirs had alleged that because of the racial restriction in the trust, the trust should fail. The court, however,
found that because of changed circumstances since the creation
of the trust,87 equitable deviation permitted the court to eliminate the racial restriction and uphold the trust.8 8 The court determined that this restriction was not the intention of Mr. Grant
and was not essential to the trust's primary requirements.
Since no South Carolina court had ever before addressed
the issue of elimination of a racial restriction, the court of appeals relied on cases in other jurisdictions which had struck sim-

83. - S.C. at -, 349 S.E.2d at 657; see South Carolina Nat'1 Bank v. Bonds, 260
S.C. 327, 195 S.E.2d 835 (1973); Mars v. Gilbert, 93 S.C. 455, 77 S.E. 131 (1912); Pringle
v. Dorsey, 3 S.C. 502 (1872).
84. See cases cited supra note 83.
85. - S.C. at .. , 349 S.E.2d at 658; see 260 S.C. 327, 195 S.E.2d 835; 93 S.C. 455,
77 S.E.2d 131.
86. - S.C. at., 349 S.E.2d at 658. When the circuit court concurs in the master's
findings of fact, a reviewing court cannot disturb these findings unless there is no evidentiary support for such findings or such findings are against the preponderance of the
evidence. See Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976);
Ex parte Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 255 S.C. 16, 177 S.E.2d 358 (1970). In Colin McK.
Grant the court found that "the record in the case amply supports the findings of the
master and the circuit judge." - S.C. at -, 349 S.E.2d at 658.
87. At the time of this lawsuit, the surrounding neighborhood had deteriorated severely. There was a high crime rate and there were no nearby shopping facilities. At the
time of the hearing, only three people lived in the house. - S.C. at , 349 S.E.2d at 657.
Moreover, since the establishment of the trust, circumstances had changed "to warrant
elimination of the racial restriction." Id. at -, 349 S.E.2d at 659.
In the past sixty years racial relations have changed significantly, and discrimination in housing has become illegal. Segregation is no longer a way of life in
Charleston. In addition, the Presbyterian Church itself has undergone significant change ....
In 1983 the Presbyterian Church of the United States and
the Presbyterian Church in the United States merged, and as a result, the
churches in Charleston are now integrated.
Id. at _ 349 S.E.2d at 659-60.
88. Id. at -, 349 S.E.2d at 660.
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ilar restrictions from the terms of a trust.8 9 The court found that
"[t]he expansion of a trust's class of beneficiaries is neither
novel nor beyond the scope of equitable deviation." 90 The court
justified its expansion of the doctrine of equitable deviation in
the present case through the intent of Mr. Grant, noting that
the primary duty of a court in construction of a will is to determine and to effectuate the testator's intent. 91 A court, however,
can use discretion when applying this intent.9 2 "In trying to effectuate this intention . . . there is no question that where conditions have substantially changed, the court is allowed considerable discretion." 93
In arguing that the trust should fail because of its racial restriction, the heirs had relied primarily on City of Columbia v.
Monteith. The court of appeals, however, found that though
the trust in Monteith was created for indigent white children,
the Monteith court "never addressed the racial restriction";9 5
therefore, Monteith did not apply. In Monteith the testatrix left
to the City of Columbia property on which there was an orphanage. She directed that there be an industrial school at this orphanage "for the children of indigent white persons. . . wherein
the children would be trained for domestic service." 96 The City
of Columbia brought suit to use the property as a regular school
unit in which students would learn industrial and domestic
training. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that "under
the will, there is no authority to use the property for any class
except the children of indigent white persons, and to use it for
others would be unauthorized and necessarily subversive of the
testatrix's intention. 9 7 The Monteith court did not address the
racial restriction because the court was able to analyze the trust

89. Id. at , 349 S.E.2d at 660. The court relied upon Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
N.A. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1972), af'd, 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Bank of Del. v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969); Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440
S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269
(Tex. Ct. App. 1966).
90. - S.C. at -, 349 S.E.2d at 660.
91. Bankers Trust v. Truesdale, 269 S.C. 191, 237 S.E.2d 45 (1977).
92. South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Bonds, 260 S.C. 327, 195 S.E.2d 834 (1973).
93. Id. at 337, 195 S.E.2d at 840.
94. 139 S.C. 262, 137 S.E. 727 (1926).
95. - S.C. at -, 349 S.E.2d at 659.
96. 139 SC. at 266, 137 S.E. at 728.
97. Id. at 284, 137 S.E. at 733.
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solely on its requirement of indigency.
In Colin McK. Grant the court of appeals found that it
could uphold Mr. Grant's intention even though the court eliminated the racial restriction. By striking the racial restriction despite Mr. Grant's express language in the creation of the trust to
provide housing for "white Presbyterians," the court of appeals
liberally construed Mr. Grant's intention.
In eliminating the racial restriction, the court avoided the
issue of state action. The heirs had alleged that the trust should
be invalidated because it violated anti-discrimination laws. The
discrimination embodied in the terms of Grant's trust is legitimate if it is conducted privately; however, when the state engages in such discrimination, the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment is invoked."8 The issue arises when a
governmental entity participates so heavily in private discrimination that the discrimination becomes state action. In In re Estate of Wilson the New York Court of Appeals examined
whether a court engaged in state action when it enforced the discriminatory terms of a trust, thus permitting the discrimination
to occur.99 The court held that such enforcement was not state
action. 10 0 In Colin McK. Grant the South Carolina Court of Appeals did not address the issue and, instead, struck the restriction from the terms of the trust.
In Tinnin v. First United Bank,'0 ' the Mississippi Supreme
Court examined a case similar to Colin McK. Grant. The testator in Tinnin created a trust for students who were "of the Caucassion [sic] race and. . . none other.'10 2 The bank, as trustee,
made loans from the trust without regard to race or color, and
the testator's heirs sued, alleging the bank's "administration of
10 3
the trust was contrary to the terms of' the testator's will.
Though the Mississippi court applied both the cy pres and the
equitable deviation doctrines, the court in Tinnin examined the
same issue of intent that the court of appeals analyzed in Colin
McK. Grant. The Mississippi court focused on whether, "given

98.
(1983).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900
Id.
Id. at 479-80, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
502 So. 2d 659 (Miss. 1987).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 662.
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the options of administration of the trust on a non-discriminatory basis or dismantling the trust and delivery of its assets to
the [heirs]," the testator would have preferred one of these options over the other. 10 4 The court found that "while charitable
trusts are favored by the law, courts may not ignore the testator's intent in order to give effect to doubtful trust provisions.

10

5

The Mississippi court further stated that the central

issue in these cases is whether the unenforceable racial exclusion
was "'incidental' or 'integral' to the testator's purpose." 10 The
Tinnin court, however, held that the testator's express language
and the historical context of the will indicated the racial limitation was not idly inserted.10 7 The court then vacated the lower
court's judgment striking the racially restrictive clause and remanded the case. While this is an interesting analysis, it is not
the interpretation of the South Carolina Court of Appeals.108
In cases involving trusts that include racially restrictive
clauses, some jurisdictions uphold the trust by striking the racial
restriction.10 Other jurisdictions, however, have invalidated
such trusts because the racial restrictions are contrary to public
policy and to the laws of the United States. 110 In Colin McK.
Grant the South Carolina Court of Appeals set a broader precedent than that which existed under previous standards in the
state: the court used equitable deviation to amend the administrative terms of a charitable trust (through eliminating its racial
restrictions) to effectuate the terms of the trust.
Janet C. Brooks

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 667.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.

108.

-

S.C. at

-,

349 S.E.2d at 660.

109. See United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va.
1975); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd,
487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970); Bank
of Del. v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969); Trammell v. Elliot, 230 Ga. 841, 199
S.E.2d 194 (1973); Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
110. See Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Evans
v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); La Ford v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530
(1959).
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